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Warning behavior prior to an act of severe targeted school violence was often not
recognized by peers and school staff. With regard to preventive efforts, we attempted
to identify barriers to information exchange in German schools and understand
mechanisms that influenced the recognition, evaluation, and reporting of warning
behavior through a teacher or peer. Our analysis is based on inquiry files from 11
cases of German school shootings that were obtained during the 3-year research
project “Incident and case analysis of highly expressive targeted violence (TARGET).”
We conducted a qualitative retrospective case study to analyze witness reports from
school staff and peers. Our results point to subjective explanations used by teachers
and peers toward conspicuous behavior (e.g., situational framing and typical adolescent
behavior), as well as reassuring factors that indicated harmlessness (e.g., no access to
a weapon). Additionally, we found organizational barriers similar to those described in
US-American case studies (e.g., organizational deviance).
Keywords: warning behaviors, threat assessment, targeted school violence, school shooting, case study
INTRODUCTION
A key finding from the retrospective analysis of cases of severe targeted school violence (e.g.,
school shootings) is that these violent acts can be regarded as an endpoint of a long-term negative
developmental pathway (e.g., Levin and Madfis, 2009; Scheithauer et al., 2014; Sommer et al.,
2020). Furthermore, there is a consensus in the literature on school shootings that several types
of warning behaviors and indicators of a personal crisis were observable by persons in the school,
family, or peer context prior to a violent act (Hoffmann et al., 2009; Rocque, 2012; Bondü and
Scheithauer, 2014b; Gerard et al., 2016). Perpetrators either gave warning to peers by announcing
an attack (“leakage” cf. Meloy et al., 2012), made direct threats to kill toward potential victims,
or displayed behaviors that can be regarded as indicative of a psychosocial crisis (e.g., sudden
behavioral changes, social withdrawal, or school absenteeism). However, as international case
studies reveal, warning behaviors were often not recognized or responded to by the perpetrators’
peers and members of school staff (Daniels J.A. et al., 2007; Syvertsen et al., 2009; Scheithauer
and Bondü, 2011). Newman et al. (2004) found the inability of the social support systems to
identify and bundle warning behaviors—beside social marginality, individual vulnerabilities, access
to guns, and cultural scripts—to be one of five necessary conditions for school shootings. It is
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significant to understand why warning behaviors that became
apparent in the school context were not recognized or adequately
identified by peers and school staff, and—if identified—a
progression of a negative psychosocial development could not
be averted through case management measures. In that respect,
research findings from US-American case studies provide some
explanations taking schools’ organizational structures, as well as
peer group norms, into account (Fox and Harding, 2005; Daniels
J. et al., 2007; Pollack et al., 2008). In the following, we present
structural barriers as well as challenges school staff and peers
are facing when identifying, assessing, evaluating, and handling
students’ warning behaviors.
Awareness of Potential Warning
Behavior
Research provides evidence that a school’s organizational
complexity and lack of resources are barriers to successful
communication and crisis management. Fox and Harding (2005)
consider “organizational deviance” as a structural obstacle,
meaning that warning behavior of students is not recognized
and properly handled by school staff and results from routines
and behaviors in an institution that were established to serve a
specific purpose. For instance, Fox and Harding (2005) found a
general tendency in members of large organizations to primarily
respond to behavior that disturbs an organization’s day-to-day
functioning (e.g., aggressive behavior; “The squeaky wheel gets
the oil”; “decoy problem”). However, this scheme of action may
not be sufficient in cases of students’ trajectories leading to severe
school violence. Many school shooters did not show aggression
or apparent frustration prior to an attack, even while already
engaging into planning behavior, but were more “invisible kids,”
a term used by Bender et al. (2001) referring to students who did
not draw much teacher attention on them. Moreover, a single
school staff member’s autonomy in day-to-day decision-making
and task segregation can result in “structural secrecy” and “loose
coupling” leading to what is described as “institutional memory
loss” in the literature (Vossekuil et al., 2002; Fox and Harding,
2005). Due to a lack of time resources, information on student
warning behavior is often not shared with colleagues or reported
to authorities (Harding et al., 2002). Instead, an observation
remains fragmented within a school. Moreover, typical conflict
situations in a school require quick reactions from educational
staff who primarily rely on gut feelings instead of an informed
decision-making procedure (Leuschner et al., 2011). A pilot
study conducted in 2009, the Berlin Leaking Project, indicated a
significant lack of knowledge and uncertainty in risk assessment
among German school staff (Bondü et al., 2011). Teachers
reported a strong need for general sensitization and intense
expert training to create awareness for the topic. Additionally,
participants have demanded increasing support and counseling
from their local professional network (Leuschner et al., 2011).
“Information fragmentation” can also occur when observations
of a student behavior are not exchanged with professionals
from a school’s external network and local service institutions.
Eventually, a lack of inter-institutional cooperation can become
a significant barrier to effective case management and the
initialization of supportive measures for an adolescent in crisis
(Harding et al., 2002). Finally, an insufficient documentation of
observations is another structural risk factor: data on apparently
harmless disciplinary incidents are often not recorded in a
student’s file due to law restrictions or a well-meant “clean-slate”
mentality. Information on a student’s social biography, family
background, or psychological particularities literally “diffuses”
and cannot be integrated in case assessment after a student
transitions to secondary school or another school district. From
a developmental perspective, this can have a harmful impact,
since teachers at a new school will have difficulties to evaluate the
progression of a student’s crisis properly.
Identification and Correct Interpretation
of Students’ Potential Warning Behavior
In the majority of cases, peers—and not adults—were the first
to identify behavioral changes (Bender et al., 2001; Oksanen
et al., 2013; Madfis, 2014). In most cases, peers of subsequent
perpetrators had advanced knowledge about a planned attack but
followed a “code of silence” and opted to withhold knowledge
or concern from an adult (Daniels J.A. et al., 2007; Syvertsen
et al., 2009; Madfis, 2014). The “code of silence” is a behavioral
norm followed by adolescents to protect a peer from trouble,
implying not to share conspicuous information (e.g., leaking
behavior, or a peer’s problems) with an adult or authority
figure. Thus, for the majority of school shootings, indicators of
a perpetrator’s negative psychosocial development were hardly
visible to adults; consequently, school staff did not obtain the
significant information necessary to identify a student in crisis.
In a qualitative study conducted by the United States Secret
Service as part of the United States Safe School Initiative
(SSI), Pollack et al. (2008) interviewed 119 students that were
involved as bystanders in school shootings that happened in
the United States. The authors refer to bystanders as “students
who had some prior knowledge that an attack was planned.”
The study revealed that 59% of bystanders reported advanced
knowledge about the perpetrator’s violent fantasies, often days
or weeks prior to the attack, and 82% had their information
directly from the perpetrator, but did not share it (Pollack
et al., 2008). Additionally, school staff face challenges in the
identification and correct interpretation of students’ warning
behavior potentially leading to school shootings. Predictions of
school shooting behavior based on risk factors of former shooters
using checklists (i.e., profiling) are inappropriate, as they would
lead to a high amount of falsely identified students, which may
result in stigmatization and unreasonable reduced sense of safety
in schools (Borum et al., 2010). School staff may tend to rely on
personal presumptions or media-disseminated knowledge about
school shootings without reliable information about students’
warning behavior.
Evaluation of Seriousness of Students’
Threats and Warning Behavior
Peer bystanders mostly underestimated the seriousness of a
threat (e.g., threat was a “joke” or made “in jest”) or did not
believe their peer would be able to carry it out. Pollack et al.
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(2008) found “misjudgment of the likelihood and immediacy
of an attack” and “disbelief in seriousness of threats” as
explanations to keep information to themselves. Finally, Wike
and Fraser (2009) identified “high-risk-school cultures” among
US-American schools with a school shooting attack, which
described a social climate that encourages low school bonding
and high “social stratification” and provides few opportunities for
participation, rewards, and positive interaction between teachers
and students, hence fostering bullying, harassment, and other
forms of violence. On the contrary, Eliot et al. (2010) used a
sample of 7,318 students from 291 schools from the Virginia High
School Safety Study to examine the correlation of characteristics
related to school culture with school. The authors found that the
students’ willingness to seek help from an adult when confronted
with a threat of violence increases with a supportive school
climate and perceived support from teachers, as well as a positive
attitude toward the school (Eliot et al., 2010).
Finding an Appropriate Response to
Students’ Warning Behavior
One effort in preventing school violence in the United States
is described under the term “zero tolerance,” referring to a
range of policies that seek to impose severe sanctions (e.g.,
suspensions and school expulsion) for minor offenses in hopes
of preventing more serious ones (Borum et al., 2010; Muschert
and Madfis, 2013). However, due to the lack of empirical
evidence of any positive effect in deterring or reducing school
violence, zero-tolerance policies have been questioned and even
criticized as measures contrary to the principles of a healthy child
development (Gregory and Cornell, 2009; Borum et al., 2010).
The challenge of finding an appropriate response to students’
warning behavior can be illustrated by Sommer et al. (2016)
who analyzed interventions of school staff when confronted with
a student’s psychosocial crisis at risk for a school shooting (cf.
Bondü and Scheithauer, 2014c). While in most cases school staff
responded to the student crisis or warning behavior by initiating
resource-oriented measures, finding appropriate interventions
in high-risk cases (e.g., student in possession of guns, detailed
execution plans) proved to be a particular challenge. Often
lacking sustainable knowledge or networks to accessible experts
(e.g., prevention officers and psychotherapists), school staff
mostly dealt with the students’ critical behavior within the
institution, which might have resulted in feelings of overstraining
and unsafety (Sommer et al., 2016).
To summarize, a growing body of case studies and research
on organizational risk factors has produced valuable insights
into the phenomenon of severe, targeted school violence from
a social framing perspective. The identification of social and
structural risk factors, organizational deviance, and a negative
school climate along with a better understanding of why peers
of subsequent perpetrators underestimated the seriousness of
threats points to opportunities of school-wide prevention and
measures with a focus on the individual perpetrator (e.g., risk
assessment). The purpose of this study is to identify barriers to
information exchange in German schools with a school shooting
incident and to highlight organizational risk factors as well as risk
factors resulting from peer group norms. Additionally, the paper
will discuss underlying mechanisms and individual assumptions
of peers and teachers that had an impact on the identification of
conspicuous behavior and to investigate them more closely. With
regard to preventive efforts, the following research questions will
be addressed: (1) Which measures of case management were
initiated either within the schools, or with the help of a school’s
professional support network? (2) How did peers respond to
threats and leakage, and what can we learn about adolescent
code of silence and peer evaluation of conspicuous behavior?
(3) Which assumptions and specific factors can be found in
the material that led teachers and peers to assess a conspicuous
behavior as concerning or alarming? How did teachers and peers
attempt to explain a behavioral change in the perpetrator that in
retrospect can be considered a warning behavior?
Eventually, by integrating research findings from United States
studies on school risk factors with results from the analysis
of German school shooting cases, we aim to introduce an
environmental perspective—in addition to the identification of
individual risk factors—on the developmental pathways toward
school shootings. A study on motives and specific constellations
of individual risk factors of the perpetrator (e.g., mental
disorders) provides an understanding of why an individual
commits a violent act. In addition, a deeper investigation of
social and organizational risk factors will help to explain why
warning signs were not taken seriously, or individual support
measures failed, which could eventually open new windows for
prevention (e.g., by enhancing the expertise of persons within the
social environment of an adolescent in crisis, such as school staff
and peers) and simultaneously increase their feelings of safety.
Overall, the study serves the purpose to bring light to the question




Based on a definition from Bondü and Scheithauer (2014a,b)
of school shootings, the following inclusion criteria to select a
case were applied: (1) violent act was planned and executed by
a current or former student of the school; (2) potentially lethal
weapons were used (including non-shooting weapons, such as
bombs or large knives); (3) the perpetrator had an intention
to kill multiple victims associated with the school context; and
(4) the perpetrator was not older than 25 years old when
committing the violent act. Using the GENIOS and LexisNexis
media databases, online archives of a total of 340 daily and weekly
newspapers were systematically screened for the following search
terms: “Amok (rampage),” “School Shooting,” “Terroranschlag
(terroristic attack),” and “Mordanschlag (assassination attempt).”
Through this search, 46 cases of potentially lethal school violence
were identified, with a total of 11 meeting our inclusion criteria.
The inquiry files from those 11 cases of German school shootings
were obtained from the law enforcement authorities by the
TARGET Research Group during the project “Incident and
case analysis of highly expressive targeted violence (TARGET)”
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between 2013 and 2016. The average age of the perpetrators
ranged from 13 to 23 years (M = 17.5, SD = 2.8); two were females
and five committed suicide after the attack. Table 1 summarizes
all cases that were included in the analysis. To preserve the
anonymity of the perpetrators and follow strict data protection
guidelines according to German law, the perpetrators’ names
will neither be published in the following sections, nor will the
material analyzed and reported allow for their identification.
We used inquiry files instead of media reports to avoid bias
by subjective theories of journalists (cf. Danner and Carmody,
2001).The obtained files included court reports, judgments (if
the perpetrator did not commit suicide following the shooting),
comprehensive police investigative, as well as witness reports,
forensic-psychiatric expert assessments, and additional personal
documents written by the perpetrator (e.g., diaries, unpublished
testimonies, or personal essays).
Qualitative Analysis
We conducted a qualitative retrospective case study mainly
based on a content analysis approach (Kohlbacher, 2006)
to analyze witness reports. Statements from school officials,
teachers, friends of the perpetrator, and other peers were obtained
during the police investigation. Information included warning
behaviors and crisis symptoms that were recognized prior to
the attack, subjective explanations for behavioral changes of the
perpetrator, assumptions about the perpetrator’s motivation to
commit a shooting, and detailed reports about the implemented
measures once a conspicuous behavior was observed and which
information was exchanged with others. We used the ATLAS.ti
software, version 7.5 to develop our coding scheme. The coding
procedure was initialized by an open coding of the first randomly
selected case and was refined and enhanced based on the
material of three additional cases. The analysis was mainly
performed by one investigator (a female psychologist), who
worked independently at the beginning of the thematic analysis.
The coded material was continuously discussed with two other
colleagues (one male sociologist and one female psychologist) to
reach consensus on the main concepts. To assess the credibility
of codes and themes, the entire research process was recorded,
reviewed, and reflected upon by the investigators and discussed
with three other members of the research team.
During that stage, the development of our coding scheme
was shaped by an inductive approach with openness to find new
meaning in the data. Data collection and analysis were developed
together in an iterative process. The concepts emerging from
the data were then integrated with preliminary theory-informed
categories (e.g., barriers to effective identification of risk factors,
warning behaviors) allowing us to generate more specific
hypotheses and develop explanatory codes. Thus, all data have
been organized around certain topics (e.g., code of silence), key
themes, or central questions. To generate those categories, we
integrated existing theories and findings from the literature on
school shootings, as well as results from the sociological study
of barriers to effective information exchange in schools. The first
four cases, as well as all remaining cases, were then coded with
the developed final coding scheme. The coding scheme reflecting
theoretical constructs was refined by clustering open codes
together into categories that were guided by theoretical concepts
but simultaneously grounded on the empirical data. It includes
definitions for all codes, categories (e.g., warning behaviors, or
seriousness assessment factors) and sub-categories (e.g., violence-
specific warning behavior, general crisis symptoms, or “alarming”
and “reassuring” factors), as well as examples when they were
applied. We examined the subjective explanations from school
staff and peers once they became aware of a conspicuous behavior
drawing on the retrospective analysis of witness reports. This
was followed by an in-depth analysis of why a certain behavior
was not adequately identified as warning behavior, and why the
respective observation was not shared or reported. Additionally,
we obtained information on the frequency of case management
measures that were initiated by the schools and their professional
network, as well as distinguished specific responses from peers
that had observed leakage or a threat, or had other knowledge
that a school shooting was planned.
RESULTS
Research Question 1: Measures of Case
Management and Student Support
Case management measures were divided into measures that
were initiated within a school drawing on the expertise and the
professional background of school staff and related professions
(within institution), and measures that were implemented within
the larger professional network of a school. These required
information exchange and cooperation between local institutions
(e.g., a school psychologist, youth counselor, and police) or
the student’s family (between institutions). Table 2 reports
the frequencies of measures that were initiated along the
developmental pathway in the analyzed cases.
Measures Within the School
In all 11 cases, a school official or teacher at least once
initiated some type of supportive face-to-face conversation with
the student as a response to a conspicuous behavior. This
included making an effort to understand a student’s behavior
by asking questions, or actively encouraging the respective
student to open up after he or she was seeking someone to
talk to. Surprisingly, the school counselor was involved in case
assessment and management in only two cases. Furthermore,
in 10 cases, schools responded to conspicuous behavior, or a
behavior that has already been identified as warning behavior,
with a pedagogical measure. This included light disciplinary
measures (e.g., doing additional homework), the advice to cut
back on a negative behavior to avoid severe consequences (e.g.,
as a response to aggressive tendencies), mediation, and conflict
resolution (e.g., after a threat has been made in a conflict
situation with a peer). In addition, conversations took place
seeking to solve mainly academic problems instead of discussing
a student’s concerns and problems at home (e.g., when a student’s
academic performance dropped suddenly). In seven cases, stricter
regulatory measures were implemented as a means to sanction
the respective problem behavior (e.g., disciplinary difficulties). In
four cases, a student was expelled from school or dismissed from
vocational training after a major disciplinary issue (e.g., repeated
or extended absence from school, student refused to follow
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TABLE 1 | Cases of school shootings in Germany used for qualitative analysis.
Time, place Course of offense
03/19/2002, Brannenburg A 16-year-old student shoots his teacher with one of his father’s guns. He himself survives badly injured after attempting suicide.
02/19/2002, Eching/Freising After killing two of his co-workers, a 21-year-old former student fatally wounds the headmaster of his former school and
seriously injuries another teacher. He then commits suicide.
04/26/2002, Erfurt A 19-year-old former student kills 12 teachers, 2 students, 1 administrative employee, and 1 police officer at his former school
with a gun before shooting himself.
07/02/2003, Coburg A 16-year-old student shoots at his classroom teacher. However, he misses her twice. A second teacher who entered the
classroom is wounded by a bullet, before the offender takes a fellow student hostage and finally shoots himself.
11/20/2006, Emsdetten An 18-year-old student injures 36 persons at his former school with firearms and smoke bombs, before committing suicide.
03/11/2009, Winnenden The shooting of a 17-year-old former student resulted in the deaths of 12 people at his former school and 3 civilians he killed at
a car dealership. His flight lasted several hours. He committed suicide, when he was surrounded by police forces.
05/11/2009, St. Augustin A 16-year-old girl planned to stab several teachers and students at her school and to set the school on fire, using Molotov
cocktails. When she was detected by a classmate, she injured her and fled from school. She turns herself over to the police in
the evening of the same day.
09/17/2009, Ansbach An 18-year-old perpetrator armed with Molotov cocktails and an axe injured 15 people, 2 of them severely. Police arrived on the
scene shortly after the offense began and took him into custody.




Armed with several knifes and an axe, a 13-year-old girl sets a fire in the school’s hallway and threatens to kill classmates.
Before injuring somebody she is arrested by police. One and a half year after the first event and a stay at a psychiatric clinic, she
attacks her classmates at her new school using her father’s gas gun.
05/22/2012, Memmingen A 15-year-old student enters his school with his father’s gun, aiming to shoot his former girlfriend. Since he cannot find her, he
leaves school and starts shooting on a sports ground, where he was arrested by police.
TABLE 2 | Measures of case management in school shooting cases in Germany.
Measures for case management Number of
cases
Professional network cooperation (between institutions):
Talk to parents at least once (initiated by parents or school) 11
Refer student to counseling, diagnostic investigation, or therapy 7




Involve local school psychologist Measures within the school
(inside institution):
3
Talk to student in crisis 11
Pedagogical reaction 10
Information exchange with a colleague 8
Regulatory measure 7
Expulsion from school or vocational training 4
Involve school counselor 2
Crisis prevention (structured or guideline-informed) 2
instructions from school staff, or lacked compliance with legal
guidelines). Regarding school-internal information exchange and
case evaluation, we found that in eight cases, a school staff
member chose to communicate the concerning observation to a
colleague. However, our data reveal that a structured information
exchange and assessment (e.g., the information was stored in
a written document, or forwarded to the principal, and some
criteria were applied to assess the behavior) was conducted in not
more than two cases. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain a
proof of validity of the criteria or guidelines that were applied in
these two cases and could not find any details about their origin
in our material.
Professional Network Cooperation
In all 11 cases, a school staff member or the principal made an
attempt to talk to a parent of the perpetrator (or vice versa)
at least once, informing them about conspicuous behavior, a
decline in academic performance, or disciplinary difficulties. This
indicates that at some point during their negative developmental
pathway, every perpetrator showed a behavior that urged school
staff to establish cooperation with the families. However, further
analysis revealed that this cooperation was often not sustained
and intensified in the long term as no specific agreements
or follow-up meetings were scheduled. In seven cases, schools
forwarded a case to an external mental health institution for an
in-depth diagnostic investigation or counseling or with the goal
to send the student into long-term therapy (e.g., when noticing
aggressive tendencies, social withdrawal, or suspecting family
problems). Six students were hospitalized at some point during
their psychosocial crisis, mostly short time for crisis intervention
(e.g., after showing self-destructive tendencies or attempting
suicide). The police got involved in four cases after a student
made a threat providing concrete details about a potential offense.
Surprisingly, despite being closely associated with the school
context, school psychologists were only involved in three cases,
and some witness reports point to an insufficient availability due
to a lack of time resources.
Research Question 2: Peer Responses to
Threats and Leakage
We identified how peers responded to violence-specific, highly
alarming warning behavior including threats, leakage, and having
information that an attack was planned or knowing a perpetrator
had access to a weapon. Estimating the effect of a peer response
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TABLE 3 | Peer responses to threats and leakage in school shooting cases in
Germany.
Responses Number of cases
Discourage perpetrator from executing the threat 9
Express concern, talk to perpetrator 8
Share information within peer group 7
Share information with an adult 5
Reduce contact or end relationship 5
Not take perpetrator seriously, laugh at perpetrator 4
Refused to help when asked 3
Incite perpetrator to start a shooting 3
on the perpetrator’s motivation in terms of making him or
her overthink or postpone the final decision to execute an
attack is neither feasible nor useful in retrospect. Nevertheless,
from a theoretical perspective, we found responses ranging
from potentially facilitating an attack (e.g., making jokes or
completely ignoring a threat) to probably averting an attack
(e.g., discouraging the threatening peer from carrying out the
original plan, or sharing information with others by seeking
help from an adult). Table 3 reports the number of cases with
reported peer responses.
In all 11 cases, at least one peer had some piece of knowledge
about the perpetrator’s plans, or that he/she was considering a
school shooting attack. In nine cases, a peer actively tried to
discourage the perpetrator from executing a threat or leakage
(e.g., by trying to minimize a perpetrator’s revenge fantasies or
anger, highlighting positive aspects, or showing that one does not
approve such behavior). In eight cases, a peer made an attempt
to engage the perpetrator into a deeper conversation in order to
obtain more information, learn more about a perpetrator’s actual
motivation and struggles, and express their concern as a friend.
Contrarily, being confronted with a threat, leakage, or planning
behavior, in five cases, peers socially withdrew by reducing
contact to the perpetrator, or ultimately ended the friendship.
Peer reports reveal that either they were highly alarmed and
anxious and tried to avoid the perpetrator entirely, or—in three
cases—they did not expect the perpetrator to execute a threat
or leakage. Nevertheless, peers were deeply irritated by the
perpetrator’s behavior and could not identify with the friendship
anymore. Furthermore, despite that some perpetrators leaked
repeatedly, or made multiple threats, peers in four out of 11 cases
reported retrospectively that they did not take these statements
seriously, and—in three cases prior to reducing contact—laughed
at the perpetrator and made jokes about a potential school
shooting. In three cases, a peer was asked to help a perpetrator
either in preparing an attack or serving as an accomplice in
the attack. Simultaneously, in two of these cases and one other,
other peers have reacted to the perpetrator’s violent plan by
incitement (i.e., “go and do it”). Witness reports of the respective
peers revealed, however, that none of them expected that the
perpetrator would execute a school shooting and intended to use
irony and jokes to “demonstrate the madness of the plan.” In
seven cases, a concerned peer shared an observation within the
peer group, discussing the probability of an attack. In five of these
cases, code of silence was ignored and an observation or concern
was reported to an adult (a teacher or parent).
Research Question 3: Subjective
Explanations and Factors Influencing the
Identification of Warning Behavior
Witness reports from school staff and peers helped to understand
why some behavioral changes of the perpetrators were identified
as a warning behavior, or indicators for a psychosocial crisis, and
others were ignored, trivialized, or not taken seriously within
the school context. Thereby, we examined the following: (1)
behavioral changes that were recognized in the first place and
increased awareness of school staff and peers, (2) subjective
explanations that school staff and peers gave to themselves
to justify or contextualize a behavior, and how this led to
information diffusion; (3) factors that were used to evaluate the
seriousness of a behavioral change once it has been identified
as warning behavior that could not be explained otherwise;
and (4) action steps that were taken as a consequence of the
seriousness evaluation. Figure 1 illustrates factors influencing
the identification of warning behaviors recognized in 11 cases of
school shootings in Germany.
Becoming Aware of a Conspicuous Behavior
School staff, in general, became aware of a student in crisis when
the perpetrator made a direct threat or showed an interest in
violence. “On a Monday morning being asked about the past
weekend, he talked about a movie he had seen, where a character
was brutally thrown against a wall by an offender, and blood was
running all over the place. He was fascinated by the fact that
anyone could harm another person in such a way, and seemed to
approve of this behavior. I had the impression he found a certain
enjoyment in watching how others got tortured. All students in class
could hear this, it was during third grade.”
In addition to these violence-specific behaviors, school
staff were naturally more likely to recognize indicators of a
psychosocial crisis that became apparent in the classroom, were
linked to academic success, or could not be ignored because the
behavior disrupted daily routines (“The squeaky wheel gets the
oil.”) as well as disciplinary difficulties, aggressive tendencies,
and sudden behavioral changes. After learning from a colleague
about a perpetrator’s conspicuous behavior in class, the school
principal tried to obtain additional information: “After hearing
this, I had a closer look at the grades he got recently. I had
to come to the conclusion that there in fact was a decline in
important school subjects, which was definitely an information to
be concerned about.” As opposed to this, from all general crisis
indicators, peers predominantly noticed social withdrawal and
isolation, mostly referring to it as a well-known personality trait
or tendency based on their experiences with the perpetrator.
“When I called him at home, he would respond immediately. I
assumed that he rarely left the house to go out. He was the typical
‘quiet type of guy,’ almost invisible. I never thought he could do
something like a school shooting.” “She was mostly online and glued
to her computer all day. She didn’t want to engage in any activities
with us.” or “He often was alone in the classroom, and didn’t
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FIGURE 1 | Subjective explanations and factors influencing the identification of warning behavior.
have any real friendship with anyone.” Additionally, peers became
aware of violence-specific warning behavior, such as an interest
in violent media, ego-shooters, and weapons. Furthermore, they
were the primary recipients for leakage, planning behavior,
or direct threats.
Subjective Explanations and Identification of a
Warning Behavior
After becoming aware of a behavioral change, our data indicate
that school staff as well as peers intuitively attempted to find
explanations for an underlying motivation of the shown behavior.
This includes explanations based on a situational dynamic, a
perpetrator’s developmental stage, peer group norms, or other
individual characteristics of the student. Moreover, differences
are shown in the explanation for conspicuous behavior between
peers and school staff. For instance, peers explained a leakage in
combination with revenge fantasies with a perpetrator’s strategy
to manage anger and regulate emotions after a conflict with
a teacher. Being asked about a leakage made by a perpetrator
during seventh grade, following a conflict with a teacher
(“Someone should shoot him [the teacher] dead.”), a peer
retrospectively reported: “He always said this when he was angry
at a specific teacher. I‘d say everyone has made such statements
once in a while. That was not a plan nor an intention to be taken
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seriously.” A similar situational explanation was provided by the
peers during police investigation in another case, being asked if
they never questioned the statements made by the perpetrator:
“Yes, we did ask him, why he would want to kill Ms M. He
responded that he wants to kill her, because she said she wants to
make sure he‘ll get expelled from school as soon as he gets a bad
grade in a school report. According to him, she said this to him in
person. He often had to stay behind after school when he didn‘t
finish homework.” Likewise, other leakages and even threats were
interpreted as a joke by the peers, relying on a perpetrator’s non-
verbal communication cues while making the statement (e.g.,
tone of voice, smiling), as the following quotations reveal: “It‘s
3 weeks ago that he mentioned casually such a school shooting
would be cool when we chatted about school shootings in general.
But, he never said this in a serious tone. To me, it sounded like a
joke so I didn‘t care about this a lot.” or “Well, yes, she was kind of
interested in this [school shootings]. She also mentioned she wanted
to do something like this, too. Anyway, there was always a touch of
irony in her voice, so everyone of us thought she was making jokes
or craving attention.” A perpetrator’s interest in weapons or ego-
shooter consumption was explained by a social peer group norm,
which was socially approved and therefore not concerning: “We
knew he often played Counterstrike, we all did. He was pretty good
at it. Everyone in school admired him for his gaming skills.”
As opposed to this, school staff explained aggressive behavior
as caused by rebellion and a lack of discipline, whereas
academic failure was perceived to be a consequence of a
perpetrator’s laziness instead of an indicator to a long-term
critical development. “By ‘popping up on the radar’ I mean
that he showed rebellious and attention-seeking behavior. He
refused to follow instructions from colleagues, and tried to get
attention from classmates by giving childish answers to the teacher’s
questions.” Interestingly, school staff reported to have noticed
sudden behavioral changes during the course of the negative
development. While the majority of these new-quality behaviors
were primarily alarming to teachers in the first place, most of
them were eventually explained by typical adolescent behavior,
and some were actually regarded as an indicator to a positive
development. In one case, a perpetrator suddenly joined private
tutoring—1 week before the shooting. “His math teacher urged
him to join tutoring for quite a while. However, he never showed
any interest in following her recommendation, until last Tuesday,
when he showed up for the very first time. We were positively
surprised.” Having a closer look at these results, we found that the
availability of a subjective explanation for a conspicuous behavior
generally indicated harmlessness and resulted in underestimating
seriousness. An observation was consequently neither shared
(e.g., within the peer group, school, or professional network)
nor was a further investigation or case management procedure
initiated, leading to information diffusion.
Evaluation of the Seriousness of a Warning Behavior
Only when no explanation was found, a conspicuous behavior
was identified as a warning behavior, followed by an evaluation
of its seriousness and—if concerning—a step to take action
and respond. Our data revealed several additional factors that
were taken into account to evaluate seriousness that were either
alarming or reassuring. For instance, a once identified warning
behavior was evaluated as non-serious when the perpetrator’s
capability to execute a threat was doubted by the peers (“He
said he could never upset his parents, or harm them.”), the
perpetrator—presumably—did not have access to weapons, or the
time span between a threat or leakage and a potential attack was
overestimated. Being asked why he did not report his knowledge
about a perpetrator planning an attack to the police, a peer
responded: [What made you think an attack would not happen
too soon?] “Just because I didn‘t think she would be capable to
carry out her threats. I didn‘t even consider she would prepare the
Molotov cocktails on her own. Additionally, I found her problems
rather manageable and comparatively small. That‘s why I never
asked her about the threats.” Consequently, the observation of the
respective warning behavior was not shared or reported, leading
to information loss. The perpetrator’s behavior was then neither
monitored nor was help provided for him or her. As opposed to
this, the repetition of a leakage or threat is mostly alarming, as
well as when a perpetrator’s behavior was considered similar to
a peer’s subjective assumptions about the behavior of a “typical
school shooter”: according to peer statements in our data, this
included violent media consumption, social isolation, or other
conspicuous behavioral expressions. “During the first times he
said this, I just listened and thought by myself a lot of students
claim this without ever carrying out a plan. It was, when he
started to say these things repeatedly, and additionally mentioned
to have an armed weapon at home, I told him to stop talking
about this and such an idea would be complete nonsense.” [What
led you and your friends to the conclusion that he was a “typical
school shooter?”]. “He socially withdrew and was isolated. Apart
from that, we knew he had all those weapons in his room and
obsessively watched horror movies.” Likewise alarming was an
unexplainable conspicuous behavior that led to the impression
that anger or aggression was inhibited and continued to grow
below the surface. “It was his way of speaking. There was a
seriousness and certainty in his voice. I found him deeply agitated
yet controlled. No loud yelling or venting his rage. When he said
this, his voice was low-keyed. And he looked to the side with pure
contempt.” Eventually, if a warning behavior was accompanied
by one of those factors, it was evaluated as serious, and further
action was taken by sharing information with either other peers
or—in some cases—an adult. Moreover, school staff discussed
the respective case among colleagues, reported an observation to
school officials, involved the professional network, talked to the
parents, or initiated measures for case management.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to find answers to the
question why past school shootings could not be averted
by interventions from persons in a perpetrator’s school
environment. Specifically, we aimed to understand why
behavioral changes that retrospectively were identified as
warning behaviors or symptoms of an individual crisis were
not recognized, or—once noticed—were not evaluated as
alarming signs. We focused our analysis on the initiated
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measures within the school as well as in cooperation with the
student’s parents and professional network (research question
1). With regard to research question 2, we found peer’s reactions
to alarming behavior to be varying in dependence of peer
group norms as well as perceived seriousness of threats and
leakage. When analyzing behavioral indicators that lead to
an increased awareness of school staff and peers (research
question 3), analysis revealed violence-specific behavior to be
most likely recognized by school staff and peers. Regarding
symptoms of psychosocial crisis, school staff mostly noticed
academic failure and disrupting behavior in the class, while
peers were more aware of the perpetrator’s social withdrawal and
isolation. Interestingly also, the interpretation and evaluation
of the identified indicators differed between school staff and
peers. Peers misinterpreted threats or leakage as a joke or even
understood the classmate’s anger toward a particular teacher.
As a result, they underestimated the seriousness of the student’s
intentions, also because they doubted the perpetrator’s capability
of executing a threat. School staff explained sudden behavioral
changes with typical adolescent behavior due to puberty or minor
mental health issues. A closer evaluation and case management
was only initiated if school staff or peers found no explanation at
all for the perpetrator’s actions, identified “typical” indicators of a
potential school shooter, or got the impression that the respective
student kept anger hidden from their social environment.
As a starting point, we identified the measures and
interventions that were initiated by school staff, as well as
responses to warning behavior from peers. In all cases, school
staff responded with measures within a school and contacted
the student’s parent. Following this, we perused police witness
reports for statements that provided insight into subjective
explanations used by peers and teachers in an attempt to make
sense of a conspicuous behavior. Furthermore, we extracted a list
of alarming and reassuring factors that were considered when
evaluating a conspicuous behavior. First, our data revealed that
in a large number of occasions when a warning behavior was
adequately identified, a perpetrator’s social system responded
appropriately. In all 11 cases, at some point along the negative
psychosocial pathway, a school staff member or peer engaged
in a one-on-one conversation with the perpetrator, as well as
collaborated with the parents initiating a conversation about him
or her. Moreover, for a variety of reasons—not necessarily based
on the assumption of a school shooting—almost all cases were
referred to counseling, diagnostic investigation, or therapy, or
talked to a school psychologist at least once. However, despite
these measures, none of the perpetrators was stopped from
executing his/her attack. Data showed that students’ decline in
grades or violence-related behavior often resulted in sanctions
instead of resource-orientated support to prevent an escalation
of the student’s psychosocial crisis. This result stands in line with
research on US-American cases in which school suspensions and
expulsions reinforced the student’s crisis that escalated toward
the violent act (cf. Borum et al., 2010; Muschert and Madfis,
2013). Our analysis revealed that—in retrospect—these behaviors
were symptoms of a negative psychosocial development, and
school officials and staff did not have information about a
student’s trouble (e.g., family or social problems) and insufficient
coping mechanisms. Following this, an isolated conspicuous or
threatening behavior was—probably due to structural barriers
and a lack of knowledge—evaluated without taking the whole
picture into account. This ultimately resulted in responses that
were more likely fueled by an understandable fear rather than
coming from a perspective of preventing a negative psychosocial
development. Research on developmental pathways toward
school shootings gives evidence that perpetrators made efforts
to cope with their psychosocial strain that accompanied the
planning and fantasizing about the later violent act by opening
up and communicating their problems to others (Sommer
et al., 2020). These often hidden and ambiguous attempts of
functional coping were mostly interpreted as a reflection of
the perpetrator’s positive development but consequently went
unnoticed or unacknowledged by school staff or peers.
In the majority of cases, violence-specific behavior, such as
threats, leakage, and planning behavior, induced concern or
even fear in both school staff and peers alike. As opposed
to this, general crisis symptoms that were more subtle or
hidden (e.g., depressive tendencies and social withdrawal) were
not given much attention. This is in line with studies from
Fox and Harding (2005) that pointed to the “decoy problem”
in large organizations. Students, or perpetrators, respectively,
who disrupted a school’s daily routine by showing aggressive
behavior, or became apparent through academic failure or school
distance—all being familiar behaviors to school staff and easily
recognizable in the classroom—popped up on the radar, which
resulted in a deeper investigation or a pedagogical reaction
(“The squeaky wheel gets the oil.”). While this perceptive bias
generally ensures an organization’s day-to-day functioning, it
can result in overseeing more “invisible” warning behaviors
of quieter students (Fox and Harding, 2005). Bender et al.
(2001) refer to these “Invisible Kids” in an article highlighting
the importance of paying attention to students that internalize
anger and, thus, will more likely display subtle behavioral
changes (e.g., depressive symptoms, self-destructive tendencies,
and emotional withdrawal) instead of overt aggression, even
when in severe crisis. Furthermore, our data revealed that school
staff as well as peers relatively quickly attempted to find subjective
explanations for a concerning behavior, which ultimately resulted
in minimizing or trivializing it. While in general, we would
encourage a perspective on adolescent behavior that is not based
on fear as it can lead to stigmatization or exclusion of individual
students (Borum et al., 2010), we assume that some warning
behaviors would have been evaluated as alarming, if more
background information about a student’s situation had been
available. Since our funding resources, as well as methodological
considerations (e.g., retrospective bias), did not allow the conduct
of in-depth interviews with officials from the schools where
a shooting happened, we can only rely on witness reports
when making assumptions about institutional information loss,
i.e., information fragmentation and information diffusion that
were found in a United States case study (Fox and Harding,
2005). Whereas we found various indicators to information
exchange between two school staff members in 10 cases, these
conversations in at least nine cases did not follow a structured
protocol and were most often not documented or elaborated in a
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larger team-based case discussion. To sum up, not knowing if any
other warning behaviors had been previously identified resulted
in underestimating the seriousness of a conspicuous behavior,
and the respective behavior was therefore not documented or
exchanged within a school’s professional network or among
school staff and peers, respectively.
As previously found in US-American case studies, peer “code
of silence” additionally fostered information fragmentation in the
German cases. The result that in only five cases the classmate’s
conspicuous behavior was reported to an adult stands in line
with research by Pollack et al. (2008) as well as Madfis (2014),
discussing variables that influence the bystanders’ decision to
reveal information to school staff regarding threats. Those
students who were unwilling to come forward indicated that
they anticipated getting into trouble or being interrogated if
they share certain information (Pollack et al., 2008), leading
to the general finding that positive relations with teachers
or other adults serve as a necessary condition for breaking
the “code of silence.” Moreover, a study focusing on averted
rampage attacks suggests that school shootings might, at least
in part, be prevented if the school’s culture is sufficiently
positive for students to feel comfortable telling school staff about
conspicuous behavior. Similar to our results, in cases of averted
school shootings, bystanders neglected to come forward with
threatening behavior because they lacked certainty about the
respective student’s intentions or interpreted threats and leakage
as innocent comments or jokes (Madfis, 2014).
Moreover, in some cases, the lack of knowledge about the
perpetrator’s problems, as well as early yet unspecific indicators
of a personal crisis, resulted in overly strict disciplinary measures
when—in retrospect—measures for student support would have
been more appropriate for intervention in order to prevent an
individual crisis (Borum et al., 2010). Finally, our data revealed
that most schools at that time did not have specific guidelines
for case management and only involved school psychologists
or other counseling experts relatively late in an attempt to
stick to their own resources and expertise. This result stands
in line with research on cases of psychosocial crisis potentially
leading to school shootings (Sommer et al., 2016), in which
school staff even in cases of high risk (e.g., access to weapons
and repeated threats) preferred to initiate measures within the
school routine instead of collaborating with the professional
network. It can be only hypothesized that school staff hesitated
to involve external stakeholders to preserve the student from
stigmatization and avoid reputational damage to the school.
Furthermore, in cases that were subject to structured assessment,
a diagnostic investigation of mental health problems, or even
temporary hospitalization, our data indicate that experts were
not sufficiently trained in threat assessment and the handling
violence-specific warning behavior, e.g., revenge fantasies.
Furthermore, schools and other institutions involved in case
management were generally not aware of the importance of long-
term case monitoring. Mostly, after a first evaluation and primary
response to a warning behavior, a case was considered completed,
without further inquiry into the effectiveness of the intervention
measures or a monitoring of the perpetrator’s psychosocial
development. This, for instance, even resulted in misinterpreting
a—retrospectively—conspicuous behavior shortly before the
attack as an indicator to a positive development of the student.
Limitations
Our case data are based on witness reports obtained during police
investigation and therefore carry some inherent methodological
limitations that need to be considered carefully. First, our
findings rely on the subjective, retrospective perspective of
peers and school staff who still might have been emotionally
or cognitively influenced at the time of police investigation—
even weeks after the attack. Especially for those peers or
teachers emotionally involved with the perpetrator, trauma-
induced anxiety, memory gaps, or cognitive distortion together
with a subjective fear of legal consequences or irrational feelings
of guilt might have ended up in witness statements that differ
from what someone would answer when being asked by a
scientific interviewer. Moreover, it can be assumed that being
asked about the perpetrator’s development and conspicuous
behavior induced high levels of stress, which is found to
negatively affect both accuracy of eyewitness identification as
well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details (Deffenbacher
et al., 2004). While it is certain that police investigation was only
conducted when a witness voluntarily joined, and appeared to
be mentally and emotionally stable and accountable, we cannot
deny the potentially traumatizing impact of an act of school
shootings on survivors. More specifically, we can only roughly
imagine the thoughts and feelings of a peer who had some
information prior to the attack, but did not report it, or of a
teacher who had some conflict with a perpetrator. On top of
that, since the primary purpose of police investigation after an
attack is to investigate motives, reasons, and responsibilities,
it is possible that, when being asked about warning behaviors,
witnesses naturally attempt to minimize an alarming behavioral
change or deny a bad gut feeling retrospectively. Moreover,
when analyzing rare events such as school shootings, we must
take into account the low generalizability of findings when
making assumptions about the “population” of school shooters
or when drawing general conclusions for prevention (for an
overview, see Harding et al., 2002). The deduction of sufficient
conditions for the identification, evaluation, and management of
conspicuous behavior is dependent on the comparison of our
cases with averted violent acts (cf. Madfis, 2014). Thus, our results
are only valid for those 11 cases under study and, therefore,
fail in transferability to similar objects of investigation from
other countries.
Implications and Outlook
Based on what we know today after an attack has happened, and
following an intense case study, we can draw the conclusion that
the majority of warning behaviors were misinterpreted or their
seriousness underestimated due to insufficient communication
about the student within the school and within the professional
network (i.e., information fragmentation). Additionally, peer
code of silence, a lack of knowledge about early unspecific
indicators of a negative psychosocial development, and a
lack of structured procedures for information exchange and
documentation (i.e., information diffusion) as well as for effective
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case management including a long-term monitoring resulted
in unspecific responses to violence-specific warning behaviors
(i.e., threats or leakage). More broadly, persons in the school
environment of a perpetrator did not have sufficient knowledge,
information, and official guidelines that allowed them to
simultaneously take violence-specific warning behaviors, general
crisis symptoms, and a student’s overall situation into account
in order to draw conclusions about a negative psychosocial
development. These findings, while certainly limited to our
sample, however, point to opportunities of prevention when
being taken into account together with results on organizational
deviance and institutional information loss. An empirically
based preventive intervention should include strategies to ensure
that (1) school staff is trained to recognize a student crisis
based on indicators that are not limited to academic and
disciplinary difficulties, or alarming violence-specific behaviors;
(2) an individual teacher or peer shares a bad gut feeling
with at least one other person, even when he or she initially
doubts its significance; (3) schools as complex organizations
should follow a formal protocol that includes reliable criteria
when evaluating the seriousness of a warning behavior, e.g., a
direct threat, and take various perspectives into account; and
(4) schools should establish a procedure for case management
and involve partners from their professional network more
often and early enough. To sum up, based on our findings, we
recommend the implementation of an organizational structure
that allows a person who observes a warning behavior to easily
access knowledge about the student’s background, as well as
to share an observation and obtain information on warning
behaviors that were previously observed by others. This would
most probably result in a more accurate evaluation of the
seriousness of a concerning behavior as well as increase a person’s
willingness to report a warning behavior—even when it does
not appear to be alarming in the first place. Additionally, peers
can help to avert school shootings if they become aware of a
leakage, threat, or other warning behavior and are encouraged to
break the code of silence and preferably “over-share” a concern
or uncertainty (e.g., through an open school climate, or the
opportunity to report anonymously) (Pollack et al., 2008; Eliot
et al., 2010; Madfis, 2014). Finally, our analysis revealed an
increased need for expert knowledge and skills when dealing
with students who show violence-specific warning behavior or are
suspected to engage in planning behavior. To our view, providing
mental health professionals, as well as school psychologists
with specific guidelines regarding the diagnostic investigation
and treatment of adolescents who repeatedly communicate
threats, violent fantasies, or leakage would increase effectiveness
and sustainability of a professional, community-based case
management. As the purpose of qualitative research is not to
provide generalizable findings, the results of our study may
serve as a foundation for future quantitative or mixed-methods
studies. However, by using the chosen approach, we introduced
and described new emerging concepts such as the subjective
explanations of conspicuous behavior, which were not visible to
us beforehand and have not yet been a subject of investigation
in this detail. To our knowledge, the present study is the first
investigation focusing on responses by school staff and peers in
a sample of German cases of school shootings. Future research
should put an emphasis on cross-national differences as well
as intercultural influences when examining the relevance of a
perpetrator’s social environment in averting school shootings.
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